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Abstract
The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention to End All Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 and it is currently the 2nd most ratified human rights
convention after the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However critics argue that
many of the states that ratified CEDAW continue to discriminate against women and
girls. The region of the world where critics seem to focus much of their attention on is the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Islam and the implementation of sharia law are
often cited as the sources of discrimination against Arab women. However is this a fair
assessment of the Arab people and their culture?
This research project will examine the question, how has the Convention to
Eliminate All forms of Discrimination Against Women impacted the rights of Muslim
women? The research project identifies four case studies - Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, and
Saudi Arabia – will assess how CEDAW has impacted the change in women’s political
and social rights in each state.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. CEDAW is currently the
2nd most ratified human rights convention after the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. However human rights activists often argue that many of the states that ratified
CEDAW continue to violate the human rights of women and girls. The region of the
world where critics seem to focus much of their attention is the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA). The religion of Islam and its use of shari’a law are often cited as the
sources of discrimination against Muslim women in the MENA region. However is this a
fair assessment of the Islamic people and their countries? To assess this judgment of
CEDAW and of the Arab world, my master’s thesis will ask the research question, how
has CEDAW impacted the rights of Arab women since its ratification?
This research project examines the ongoing debate in international relations about
the development and effectiveness of international norms. Realism argues that states in
the international system operate using rational decision making based on their individual
interests. Liberalism believes states operate using normative values and institutions to
guide their actions. Scholars Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink posit that norms are
single standards of behavior and institutions are the social structures that uphold
normative values.1 To that end, treaties such as CEDAW are institutions that codify and
uphold international norms. Thirty five years have passed since the ratification of
CEDAW and most of the research on its effectiveness has been very broad, such as Wade
M. Cole’s 2013 article that analyzed 177 countries that have ratified CEDAW. In Cole’s

1

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”
International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 891, doi:10.2307/2601361.
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research he cited Arab states as countries with high ratification rates but low progress on
women’s rights. 2 Yet his paper contained no deeper analysis of the cause of this delay in
reform other than a general statement that the religion of Islam may contain inherently
anti-women values. My thesis research will begin to fill that unexplored space and seek
to understand the effectiveness of implementing international norms using international
law.
Identifying the reasons why women’s rights in the Middle East have not
progressed at a rate of other CEDAW signatories is critical to fulfilling the intention of
the convention. By examining and challenging the existing academic research on this
issue, including the assumption that Islam is an inherently anti-women faith, this research
project seeks to identify ways to improve Muslim women’s economic, political, and
social rights.

Hypothesis
My first hypothesis is a result of two ideas. First, that international norms codified
into human rights treaties can change state behavior. And second, that it is easier to
change political norms than social and cultural norms using international law. Based on
these two ideas I would like to test the following hypothesis;
H1: Arab States that have ratified CEDAW and do not have a stated reservation
to Article 2 have seen improvement in women’s rights since ratification. And
those countries who are not CEDAW participants or have reservations that

2

Wade M. Cole, “Government Respect for Gendered Rights: The Effect of the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Women’s Rights Outcomes, 1981-2004.,” International
Studies Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 2013): 246.
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essentially nullify the treaty, conversely have not seen improvements in women’s
rights.
Article 2 of CEDAW commits states to working to enforce the rights outlined in the
convention. Any state that has a stated reservation to Article 2 has effectively nullified
their ratification of the convention. To test my hypothesis I will use qualitative case
studies of states that both have and do not have stated objections to article 2.
My second hypothesis is based on political reforms to many Islamic countries’
constitutions over the past several years that have allowed for women to become more
active in government as a result of movements like the Arab Spring. States such as
Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt have all seen an increase in female voting and participation
in public office. I argue that this is because nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) both
in and outside of Muslim countries have used CEDAW as an advocacy tool to push for
political reform. My second hypothesis states:
H2: More progress has been made in political rights rather than social rights in
states that have ratified CEDAW.
To test this second hypothesis in my case studies I will examine the change in both
political and social rights after a state has ratified CEDAW. States that have ratified the
convention had to do so through domestic institutions, such as their parliaments. This
connection between state institutions and CEDAW allows NGOs a clearer path for whom
and how to lobby for women’s rights. However, since many Islamic states govern their
family code outside of their civil institutions, I argue that CEDAW makes it easier for
NGOs to push for political rights rather than social rights, such as the right to divorce or
inherit property.

6

Making the argument
Before examining the methodology of this research program we must look at the
ideas that motivate my two hypothesizes. The first idea assumes international norms can
change state behavior when they are institutionalized into human rights treaties. The
literature review will explore the history and several examples of this assumption.
Applying this assumption to women’s rights leads us to the challenge of CEDAW. While
CEDAW remains one of the most ratified human rights treaties in UN history, its failure
to influence change in Islamic states is frequently counted as proof that human rights
cannot be forced upon an unwilling state. However this research program unearths
inherent flaws within the ratification process of CEDAW that I argue are a large reason
why Islamic states have not fully adopted the treaty. Since Islamic states were allowed to
ratify CEDAW while also putting forth reservations that undermine the heart of the
treaty, they essentially did not agree to the norm that women should have equality in
political and social rights. This research program will show that Islamic states which did
not put forth such reservations or which repealed their initial reservations did make
progress on women’s political and social rights, thus taking steps towards fulfilling the
normative values of CEDAW.
The idea underlying the second hypothesis is that political rights are easier to
achieve than social rights. This separation of rights is based on how rights are affirmed by
institutions. For example, in many countries to claim ownership of property an individual
must register their claim with the government. A title or deed is then given as proof of
ownership, creating a contract between the individual and their country that proves their
right to the land. Conversely, the right to education is harder to prove or enforce. A state
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may make a law that education is a right for all citizens, but unless the state also provides
free public education and punishes truancy, it is difficult to guarantee educational access.
Institutions are key to the protection of rights but social rights often fall outside of their
purview. Thus, my second hypothesis argues that CEDAW is most effective in helping
push forward the political rights of women.

Methodology
My qualitative analysis involves selecting five Islamic states as case studies and
comparing the change in women’s social and political rights both before and after the
ratification of CEDAW in each state. The independent variable is whether or not a state
has ratified CEDAW. The dependent variable is the quality of women’s rights in each
state. From CEDAW’s main text I have identified eight political and social rights that are
core to the intention of CEDAW. The eight rights are listed in Table 1.
Table 1
Article
7
7
9
10
10
11
15
16

Definition of right
Women have the right to vote
Women can hold public office
Women have citizenship
Women can access education
Women can access contraception
Women are allowed to be employed outside of the home
Women are allowed to own property
Women are free from coerced marriage

Type of
right
political
political
political
social
social
social
political
social

This list is not exhaustive of all the rights CEDAW guarantees for women. And
several rights not specified by CEDAW have also been omitted from this list, such as the
right to abortion care. These eight rights were selected because they are clearly identified
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in the text of the convention and there is publicly available data to assess them
effectively.
To examine the eight social and political rights in each case study country I will
gather information from various sources including the U.S. State Department’s annual
Human Rights Reports, CEDAW Country Reports, the annual Freedom in the World
report by Freedom House, and Amnesty International’s Country Profiles. These sources
are a mix of NGO and government reporting, including self-reporting to the CEDAW
committee by the nations in the case study.
In the third chapter of this research project I will outline the qualities and
standards I am judging each state on in relation to the eight rights. These standards will
be based on the values outlined in CEDAW and feedback from the CEDAW Committee
on how states are implementing the convention. Depending on the availability of data, I
will seek to examine all eight rights in each of the case studies.

Case Studies and Analysis
The case selection process will involve three criteria. Selected states must be a
UN member, part of the Arab League, and capable of ratifying CEDAW on or before
2003. The first qualification is necessary because only UN members can ratify CEDAW.
The second qualification is based on trying to find a successful definition of what
constitutes the Muslim world. The MENA label is useful as a regional classification but
also includes several non-Islamic states. The 22 Arab League states unify around a
common language, Arabic, and shared faith, Islam. Additionally, not all Arab League
members have signed CEDAW, which offers control data for the independent variable.
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Thus the Arab League is a better selection criteria for this research than the MENA
region. Finally, the ability to sign CEDAW on or before 2003 guarantees states have had
at least 10 years to implement reforms since ratification. Of the 22 Arab League states, 19
meet all three criteria.
When designing this research program I explored creating a quantitative analysis
of the 19 states that meet the case selection criteria. However there is not enough publicly
available data on the political and social rights of women in all 19 states. CEDAW
specifies that member states are required to self-report the status of women’s rights in
their country every 5 years to the CEDAW Committee if they have signed the
convention. However an overwhelming majority of signatories have failed to fulfill this
requirement, contributing to the lack of publicly available information. Sources outside of
the UN, including the U.S. State Department’s annual Human Rights Report and data
from NGOs such as Freedom House are the most in depth information available on the
status of women’s rights in the 19 states, but often are more descriptive than data driven.
These reports also are not always published for each state in regular intervals, with much
data only becoming available in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, a qualitative case
study approach is the best solution for examining H1 and H2.
To choose the five case studies I examined how the 22 members of the Arab
League fulfill the case selection criteria in Table 2.
Table 2

#
1
2
3
4

Country
Algeria
Bahrain
Comoros
Djibouti

Joined UN
1962
1971
1975
1977
10

Ratified
CEDAW
1
1
1
1

Ratification
Year
1996
2002
1994
1988

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Mauritania
Oman

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Palestine
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab
Emirates
Yemen

21
22

1945
1945
1955
1963
1945
1955
1956
1961
1971
not a UN
member
1971
1945
1960
1956
1945
1956
1971
1947

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1981
1986
1992
1994
1997
1989
1993
2001
2006

N/A
1
1
0
0
1
1

N/A
2009
2000
N/A
N/A
2003
1985

1
1

2004
1984

Based on preliminary research done for the creation of this thesis proposal I have
selected Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia for the four case studies that will
examine the success of CEDAW in Muslim countries and remaining challenges. These
selected cases include states that did and did not have stated objections to Article 2,
allowing for an analysis of H1. For example, Saudi Arabia agreed to Article 2 as long as
it did not interfere with shari’a law, while Jordan did not have a stated objections to
Article 2.
The first case study will be Sudan. It is included as a case study because it did not
ratify CEDAW and will act as a control for this research project. Sudan is one of the
largest countries in Africa and has undergoing two violent civil wars in recent history. It
also contains extremely varied levels of political and social freedom for women. Sudan is
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frequently being ranked at the bottom of human rights indexes by groups like Freedom
House but also has a higher rate of women in its national parliament than many Western
states. Female genital mutilation and low female labor participation are also major
problems within the state.
Morocco has been selected as the second case study because it has seen
improvement in women’s political participation in parliament and changes to marriage,
divorce, and inheritance laws since ratifying CEDAW. This reform occurred in the early
2000s and mainly took place through changes to the national constitution and family
laws, or moudawana.3 Moroccan women’s groups worked with transnational advocacy
organizations to push for the reform, some of which was rooted in Morocco’s ratification
of CEDAW. This legislative approach to reform is a potential model for change in other
Muslim states.
Jordan is included in the case study analysis because it contains interesting
contradictions in access to social and political rights for women. As a parliamentary
monarchy Jordan allows women to vote and hold political office. Since the early 2000s
women have had an increased presence in parliament, in part because of a newly adopted
gender quota system.4 Conversely, several social rights of women in Jordan have grown
worse in the 21st century, with women lacking the right to maintain citizenship outside of
marriage and increased reports of domestic violence.
The final case study will be Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the frequent focus of
international attention as an example of a state with extremely limited access to human
3

Leila Hanafi, “Moudawana and Women’s Rights in Morocco: Balancing National and International Law,”
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 18 (2012): 517.
4
Rana Husseini, Jordan, NGO, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress and
Resistance (New York, NY: Freedom House, 2010),
http://twww.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Jordan.pdf.
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rights. Shari’a law is woven into the social and political laws of the country, requiring
women to cover their hair and skin in public and the division of genders in public spaces,
including schools. And while many states in the international community have rejected
capital punishment or physical punishment, Saudi Arabia employs both, often publicly.5
Of the five selected cases, Saudi Arabia has some of the least access to political and
social rights, allowing for interesting comparison with the other four cases.

Conclusion
The concluding chapter will focus on reviewing the major results of the analysis
sections and testing the verifiability of my thesis. It will also be a space to review
possible flaws in the study design and ways to correct them with further research. Finally,
the conclusion will propose further questions for the study of CEDAW’s impact on
Muslim women, including how to involve Islamic states more fully in the CEDAW
Committee and examining the reporting procedure and Optional Protocol of CEDAW.

5

Isobel Coleman, “The Payoff From Women’s Rights,” Foreign Affairs, June 2004,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59896/isobel-coleman/the-payoff-from-womens-rights.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This research project examines the success of international norms by studying
how CEDAW has impacted women’s rights in Islamic countries. To understand this
research question fully it is necessary to review the existing scholarship on the theory of
international norm development, the role of international treaties in human rights, the
implementation of CEDAW, and the effectiveness of CEDAW.

International norm development
International relations scholars have written at length about international norms,
with the two major schools of thought taking separate sides. Realism argues that states in
the international system operate using rational decision-making based solely on a state’s
interests. Liberalism believes states operate using normative values and institutions to
guide their actions and achieve collective goods. Finnemore and Sikkink define norms as
single standards of behavior and institutions as the social structures that uphold normative
values.6 Therefore, human rights treaties such as CEDAW are institutions that codify and
uphold international norms about women’s rights.
Finnemore and Sikkink have written extensively on how norms develop in the
international system. They theorize that norms have a “life-cycle” made up of three
stages; norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization.7 The first stage occurs when
norm entrepreneurs, such as NGOs and transnational advocacy networks, push for a
critical number of states to adopt a norm. This critical number of states can vary, but

6

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”
International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 891
7
Ibid., 895.
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Finnemore and Sikkink suggest a tipping point is reached when at least 1/3 of states in
the international system have adopted a norm.8
The second stage, norm cascade, is carried out by the states participating in the
norm. They use their influence to persuade other states to adopt the norm. Finnemore and
Sikkink point to the 1997 international landmine treaty as proof of norm cascade. The
third and final step in the life cycle of a norm is internalization, when a norm has become
so integrated into states’ behaviors that the norm is no longer an issue of debate. One
example of this is the rejection of slavery. While it still exists across the world through
sex trafficking and forced labor, all nations agree slavery itself is a basic violation of
human rights.9
Research on norm development became increasingly popular in the 1980s and
1990s in the field of international relations, no doubt heightened by the growing number
of human rights treaties passed by the UN. Nadelmann published research on which
factors impact the success of an international norm becoming a “global prohibition
regime,” meaning the norm is universally upheld. One of his key points is that a
prohibited activity (i.e. a regime) only achieves international status when unilateral and
bilateral attempts at preventing the regime have failed and the prohibited behavior crosses
national borders. Examples include slavery and the illegal drug trade.10
Nadelmann also argues that if a regime does not require significant resources or
expert skill to engage in and is frequently underreported, then the bad behavior will
flourish. Nadelmann gives examples of successful global prohibition regimes such as the

8

Ibid., 901.
Ibid., 896–897.
10
Ethan Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,”
International Organization 44, no. 4 (1990): 481–483.
9

15

anti-whaling movement. He also gives examples of failures such as the piracy of
intellectual property in digital music and movies. 11 Using his logic, several of the
regimes prohibited by CEDAW are easy to carry out undetected, such as domestic
violence and sexual assault, making them less likely to become successful global
prohibition regimes.

The role of human rights treaties
The development and enforcement of international norms often involves
codifying the norm through an institution. The UN has been one of the most robust
institutions for this codification process. Either the General Assembly of the UN or an
appointed subcommittee will draft a legal document that member nations can sign to
show they will uphold an international norm. Once signed states must also ratify the
agreement through their domestic institutions, often by referendum or a vote in
parliament. For international agreements regarding trade or security treaties often lay out
in exacting detail how binding the agreement is, outlining reporting processes and
penalties for noncompliance. However international human rights treaties are often
written with broad language to encompass large normative values, making states hesitant
to sign them if there is a robust enforcement mechanism or if the treaty many conflict
with domestic politics. Because of this concern, almost no UN human rights treaties
contain penalties for noncompliance. So why do states sign on to human rights
agreements if they are ineffective at change? Moreover, why do human rights activists
continue to support the creation of more treaties?

11

Ibid., 525–526.
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To answer this question Hathaway analyzed 160 countries that signed on to 3 core
human rights agreements ; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and CEDAW. Hathaway’s research argues that states with few domestic,
democratic institutions do not fear having to actually implement the values of a human
rights agreement. Thus they are often willing to sign on because the “collateral
consequences” of their ratification may lead to a better international reputation while not
forcing the state to actual improve its human rights issues. 12 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui
support this view, calling ratification of international human rights treaties a “paradox of
empty promise.”13
While many scholars agree that states do not immediately change their human
rights records once they have ratified a treaty, researchers do find some positive
outcomes of the treaty process in establishing international norms. Hathaway’s research
shows that states with a higher number of NGOs are more likely to see progress in human
rights after ratification than those with fewer NGOs, even if the state lacks strong
democratic institutions. Hathaway also points out the transnational impact of human
rights conventions, such as the European Union’s requirement that any new member of
the EU sign the European Convention on Human Rights.14 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui
suggest that although human rights treaties themselves most likely have no effect on the
implementation of international norms, the existence of NGOs does lead to change and

12

O. A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 51, no. 4 (August 1, 2007): 590, doi:10.1177/0022002707303046.
13
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of
Empty Promises1,” American Journal of Sociology 110, no. 5 (2005): 1378.
14
Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?,” 596.
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the drafting and ratification process for human rights treaties strengthens the presence of
NGOs on the state and international level.15

Scholarship on the creation of CEDAW
Using this framework of how international norms are codified into human rights
agreements we can now review the scholarship surrounding the creation of CEDAW.
Chapter 3 will give an in-depth explanation of the drafting, signing, and ratification
process for CEDAW. In this section we will examine how international relations scholars
have viewed the implementation of CEDAW over the past 35 years. Then we will review
the scholarship on CEDAW’s application in the Muslim world.
The most highly criticized pieces of CEDAW are the large number of reservations
by states that have ratified the convention and the weak reporting procedure for when
states violate the agreement. Research by Neumayer on “the role of reservations,
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) in international treaties” makes the case that
liberal democracies are the states that often have the most RUDs in place for human
rights agreements because they intend to adhere to the agreement. However he explains
that in the case of CEDAW Islamic states often employ “general clauses” that object to
enforcing any measures in CEDAW that violate shari’a law. This kind of general
reservation has only ever appeared in treaties regarding the rights of women and children
and he attributes it to the cultural differences in Western and Islamic states.16 In response
to this argument authors like Zwingel have pointed out that during the drafting process of
CEDAW Islamic states such as Morocco objected that the convention was heavily
15

Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, “Human Rights in a Globalizing World,” 1389.
Eric Neumayer, “Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights
Treaties,” The Journal of Legal Studies 36, no. 2 (June 2007): 407–408, doi:10.1086/511894.
16
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influenced by Western ideas of women’s rights and use reservations as a way to protect
themselves and their domestic politics from CEDAW’s influence.17
Afsharipour explains the criticism surrounding the reporting mechanism of
CEDAW. Under Article 29 of the convention a state can lodge a complaint against
another state for violating the agreement. The two states have 6 months to solve the
dispute between themselves, and then the CEDAW Committee can refer the matter to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for resolution. However many CEDAW signatories
have stated reservations against Article 29 of CEDAW and no state has ever used this
reporting procedure.18
While some human rights treaties allow for individuals to petition the UN or the
treaty bodies over violations by their home states, CEDAW had no such mechanism
when it was created. In response to criticism, in 2000 the CEDAW Committee added the
Optional Protocol, which allows individuals from states that have ratified CEDAW and
the new Optional Protocol to submit complaints. Yet very few state parties of CEDAW
have ratified the Optional Protocol amendment.19
The other reporting mechanism in CEDAW is a process of self-reporting by state
parties to the CEDAW Committee. Within one year of ratifying the convention a state
must submit a report on the status of women’s rights in its borders to the Committee.
States must then submit subsequent follow up reports every four years. However, over
2/3 of signatories have been late in submitting reports and many only submitted an initial
report and then one or two follow ups. Additionally, unlike other human rights bodies at
17

Susanne Zwingel, “From Intergovernmental Negotiations to (sub)national Change.,” International
Feminist Journal of Politics 7, no. 3 (September 2005): 404–405.
18
Afra Afsharipour, “Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women’s NGOs in the Enforcement of the
Women’s Convention,” Columbia Law Review 99, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 138–139, doi:10.2307/1123598.
19
Zwingel, “From Intergovernmental Negotiations to (sub)national Change.,” 406.
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the UN that have standing offices in Geneva, the CEDAW Committee has bi-annual
meetings in New York and often runs out of time to review reports and engage in
meaningful reviews with country representatives.20

General Impact of CEDAW
In the face of this heavy criticism of CEDAW some scholars have still found
positive outcomes from the implementation of the convention. In their 1998 book
Activists Beyond Borders Keck and Sikkink explain how transnational advocacy
networks can utilize a boomerang effect if they cannot establish a norm on the domestic
level. NGOs and advocacy groups in states will push their issues into the international
dialogue, forcing their national leaders to embrace a norm from the top down rather than
from the bottom up.21
Afsharipour argues this boomerang effect is playing out with CEDAW in some
states that have ratified the convention. Afsharipour uses Bangladesh as a case study of a
nation with weak domestic institutions, stated reservations to the convention, and a poor
history on women’s rights. After ratifying CEDAW in 1984 Bangladesh submitted its
first report in 1992 to the Committee. With no official government agency to pull
together the report, the first report ended up being a short, poorly researched document
and only touched on 1 of the 16 rights CEDAW covers. Women’s groups in Bangladesh
used the criticism the report received from the Committee and international momentum
from the 1995 Beijing Conference to convince their national government to let them help
draft the next report. The government agreed and also setup a Department of Women’s
20

Ibid., 208.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 12–13.
21
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Affairs to assist them. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw improvement in Bangladesh
on women’s labor rights and political participation, change that Afsharipour attributes to
the Bangladeshi women’s rights groups. 22
A 2013 article by Cole analyzed 177 countries that ratified CEDAW. Cole
assessed CEDAW’s impact on political, economic, and cultural rights in those 177 states.
He found that states that had ratified CEDAW saw a steady growth in women’s
participation in parliament in the subsequent years after ratification. However the same
states did not see an increase in the requirement of quotas for female participation in
government offices. Cole theorizes that this means state practices were changing even if
formal policy did not.23 This is a modification on the boomerang effect, for although state
policy did not change, behavior within the state did because of top-down pressure.
Another finding from Cole’s research was that Arab countries saw little to no impact on
women’s rights by ratifying CEDAW. Cole argues that this failure is mainly due to the
religious values of Islam, a claim that he does not explore deeply in his paper.

Impact of CEDAW on Muslim Women
Cole is not alone in his critique of Islam’s influence on the effectiveness of
CEDAW. One of the reasons for the focus on Arab states is the size and high needs of the
Muslim population. Over 300 million people live in the MENA region and about 23% of
them live on less than $2 a day. 24
22

Afsharipour, “Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women’s NGOs in the Enforcement of the Women’s
Convention,” 152–154.
23
Wade M. Cole, “Government Respect for Gendered Rights: The Effect of the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Women’s Rights Outcomes, 1981-2004.,” International
Studies Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 2013): 246.
24
“The World Bank: Middle East & North Africa,” The World Bank, accessed December 2, 2013,
http://go.worldbank.org/7UEP77ZCB0.
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Cheriff examines the progress of women’s rights in Islamic countries in a 2010
article. Cheriff outlines the three most common cultural explanations for why women in
Islamic countries have not gained gender equality under CEDAW. The first explanation
argues that that “in Muslim countries a state’s policies are dictated by Islamic law.”25
This perspective assumes that Islamic states operate almost entirely as theocracies, where
the religious values are at the root of all rights and laws. The second explanation states
that Islamic nations used religion as a way to consolidate power during the establishment
of their governments. Because of this, state institutions internalized the patriarchal values
of Islam and subsequently women were subject to those values under the law. The
cultural third explanation is that while a government itself may not be Islamic, state
leaders and elites require the support of religious leaders. So politicians uphold Islamic
values that keep women from equal rights to guarantee support from religious
constituents. 26
Scholars such as Arzt and Nadelmann support similar cultural explanations for
why Muslim women have not benefited greatly from the ratification of CEDAW. Arzt
explores the jurisprudence of shari’a law, explaining that it is based in the Quran, the
Sunna, and the consensus of Islamic scholars, called ijma.27 At least 17 states in the
MENA region identify as Islamic and others refer to shari’a law in their constitutions.
But Arzt explains that many former Ottoman nations reformed their laws to be mainly
based in civil code in an attempt to modernize as they increased their trade and
interaction with the West after World War II. Where he sees the main conflict between
25
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shari’a and Western ideas of law is the concept of individual rights. He explains that
Enlightenment thinkers like Locke and Rousseau believed individual freedom was the
root of state power, and their ideas heavily influence Western jurisprudence. Islamic law
does the opposite, believing that individuals are meant to be part of the community and
that the only inalienable rights belong to God. So there is a philosophical disconnect
between Western values of human rights and Islamic beliefs about community and God
as the root of state power.28
However recent research has pushed back on these cultural assumptions and
instead sought economic and political reasons for why CEDAW has not improved
women’s rights in Islamic states.
Cheriff’s research focuses on examining Muslim women’s citizenship and
inheritance rights as a means of assessing normative change. From her analysis of 37
countries Cheriff finds that women’s limited access to education and employment
opportunities have a bigger impact on their rights than living in a Muslim state. She uses
quantitative analysis and a case study between India and Pakistan to demonstrate her
findings. As she explains ““India has a .68 probability of nondiscrimination, and Pakistan
a mere 0.13” around nationality rights but if Pakistan’s number of women in the
workforce mirrored India’s numbers its probability would rise to .19. And if women in
Pakistan constituted half the labor force its probability of no discrimination would rise to
.40.29 . She argues that education and labor participation are the “core rights” which allow
for other areas of women’s rights to progress and must be studied as such. She gives
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examples such as the average age of marriage rising and lower fertility rates in states with
higher female education and more women working in the labor force.30
A second rebuttal to cultural explanations comes from Ross. He argues that in
fact it is Arab states’ dependence on oil wealth which keeps women out of the work
force, which in turn prevents them from gaining political power and achieving social and
cultural rights. He suggests that women have been able to increase their labor
opportunities in history through “the development of low-wage export-oriented
industries, especially in textiles, garments, and processed agricultural goods.” 31 He gives
the case study of South Korea, which industrialized in the 1970s, with women taking the
factory jobs for exported goods. By the 1970s, women in the factories had begun
organizing around labor rights and for more political power in the legislature and courts.
By the 1990s, women in South Korea had pushed forward several laws in their favor,
including a quota that political parties must set aside at least 30% of their national seats
for women.32
States that demonstrate Ross’ theory include “Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, and Oman.” These states are oil rich but have seen the least progress on
women’s suffrage and have the lowest number of women in political office.
Conversely states with little to no oil wealth like “Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Syria, and
Djibouti” each adopted women’s suffrage earlier than other Arab states and have the

30

Ibid., 1148.
Michael L. Ross, “Oil, Islam, and Women,” American Political Science Review 102, no. 01 (February
2008), doi:10.1017/S0003055408080040.
32
Ibid., 109.
31

24

most women holding political office.33 As Ross puts it “petroleum perpetuates
patriarchy.”34

How this New Research Adds to the Field
The scholarship above lays out a case for the adoption of norms through human
rights treaties but does not offer clear explanations for why Islamic states are outliers in
this process. Authors like Cole, Cheriff, and Ross offer suggestions rooted in religious
differences and economic and educational disparities. This research project seeks to
robustly test these theories. If Cole’s assumption about Islam is right then women in
Islamic states should not have seen their rights change since the adoption of CEDAW by
their home states. But if Cheriff and Ross’ suggestions about the role of education and
economic opportunities hold true then CEDAW may have led to some progress for
Muslim women.
The second area where this research project will explore new ground is the
difference between social and political rights being achieved through international human
rights treaties. As Nadelmann explained, banning a regime rests on several factors,
including the likelihood of the regime to cross state boundaries and the likelihood for it to
be underreported. Political rights often are a domestic matter, but international systems
like the United Nations allow other nations to see and examine the political practices of
all members states. And while institutions such as elections often codify political rights,
social rights are less formerly regulated, for example how marriage is governed by a
church or domestic disputes handled within a family. By identifying and analyzing the
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social and political rights of CEDAW this research program tests the effectiveness of
human rights treaties in disseminating different kinds of rights.
Now that we have examined the existing scholarship on international norms,
CEDAW, and women’s rights in Muslim states we can move on to a comprehensive
review of CEDAW’s creation.

26

Chapter 3: Overview of CEDAW
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the founding document that
defines the inalienable, individual rights of all people. Since its adoption by the United
Nations in 1948, protecting human rights has become a core value of international law.
Dozens of declarations and conventions on human rights have been enacted, but only one
has been passed which directly addresses gender. The Convention to End All
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is the only human rights treaty that
specifically outlines the rights of women. Article 1 of CEDAW clearly defines
discrimination against women as the following:
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other
field.35
Articles 6 through 17 list specific forms of this discrimination, creating a
framework which states can be held accountable to. The UN General Assembly (GA)
adopted CEDAW in 1979. Ratification followed swiftly and CEDAW is currently the 2nd
most ratified human rights convention after the Convention on the Rights of the Child.36
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Creation of CEDAW
In 1946 the GA established the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) as a
sub commission of the Commission on Human Rights. From 1949 to 1959, the CSW
created several important conventions that addresses specific rights and issues. These
included the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), the Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women (1957), the Convention on Consent to Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962), and the
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration
of Marriages (1965).37 While these documents offered specific protections, there was still
no overarching standard that defined what constitutes discrimination against women.
Without a framework, injustices could not be brought to light under international law.
Thus, in 1963 the GA adopted resolution 1921, which asked the CSW to prepare a draft
declaration outlining the human rights of women. After several years of drafting and
revisions by the CSW, on November 7, 1967 the GA adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women.38
While the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was a
success in that it outlined what constituted discrimination and listed specific rights to be
protected, the document was non-binding. At the 1975 1st World Conference of the
International Women's Year in Mexico City several UN member states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) called for the creation of a binding treaty that
addressed women’s rights. In 1976 the GA asked a working group within the CSW to
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create the text of a new binding treaty - the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women. 39

Drafting Process
The working group drafted and revised CEDAW’s language from 1977—1979.
The convention consists of several articles. Article 1 defines discrimination against
women. Articles 2-4 lay out administrative and legal ground for the treaty. Article 5 asks
state parties to the treaty to reject historic or traditional discrimination against women in
their societies. Articles 6-17 address individual rights and areas of discrimination such as
prostitution, sexual assault, work discrimination, property rights, citizenship, voting, and
reproductive health.40 The revision process was informed by members of the CSW and
received comments from NGOs from across the world.
There were some issues left out of the text of CEDAW. Violence against women
is not listed or defined as a form of discrimination in any of the articles. CEDAW also
makes no mention of abortion care, instead allowing states to determine their own
policies on the issue. Several requests for a formal complaint and enforcement procedure
were made during the drafting process but neither piece was added in. The most
significant enforcement mechanism is Article 29 which says that when states disagree
over the “the interpretation or application” of CEDAW, they have 6 months to settle by
negotiation, and then the issue will be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
41

By 1979, a final draft was agreed upon and the GA adopted CEDAW under
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Resolution 34/180 by a vote of 130 to none, with 10 abstentions. The final version of
CEDAW was presented publicly for the first time at the 1980 Copenhagen World
Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace.

Ratification
After being approved by the GA, the next step for CEDAW was ratification by
UN member states. CEDAW was designed to take effect once 20 states had ratified the
convention. This happened quickly and the convention came into force in 1981. Within
10 years of its passage, 110 states ratified CEDAW. As of 2015, 189 states have ratified
CEDAW out of 193 UN member states.42

The Committee
Article 17 of CEDAW establishes the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (Committee). The Committee is made up of 23
independent experts who monitor the implementation of CEDAW. Each state that is party
to CEDAW is allowed to nominate one expert to the Committee, and then the list of
nominees is voted upon by all CEDAW member states. If elected, experts serve 4-year
terms. The Committee is led by one Chairperson, three Vice Chairpersons, and a
rapporteur, all who are elected by Committee members.
One year after ratifying CEDAW, a state must submit a report on the status of its
compliance with the convention to the Committee. After that initial report, states must
submit a report updating the Committee on their compliance every four years. The
Committee reviews the reports and makes recommendations to the states on how to
42
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improve the treatment of women and comply with the convention. These
recommendations are non-binding because there are no penalties for non-compliance
written into the convention. The Committee also reports once a year to the UN through
the Economic and Social Council.43 The first session of the Committee met in 1982. The
Committee was initially under the UN Division for the Advancement of Women. But in
2008, it was moved to the jurisdiction of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights. Since 1986 the Committee has made over 25 general recommendations.44

Reservations
UN member states were allowed to ratify CEDAW while also submitting formal
reservations to pieces of the convention. These reservations allow the states to remove
themselves from certain parts of the agreement. According to the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, reservations that go against the object or purpose of a treaty should
not be accepted.45
However, over 70 of the 189 states that ratified CEDAW have entered
reservations against at least one Article of the convention. 46 And several of these
reservations violate the Vienna Convention. For example, Article 2 requires states to
“take all appropriate measures” to implement CEDAW but Malaysia submitted a
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reservation against Article 2. Malaysia ratified CEDAW but its reservation allows it to
not fulfill the standards set by the convention.47
In other cases, states felt CEDAW interfered with customary or religious law. For
example, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia all entered
reservations against women’s protection from forced marriage, right to citizenship, right
to inheritance, and right to divorce. In the language of their reservations the states
explained that these rights conflict with their government’s interpretation of Islamic
shari’a law. 48
Finally, 40 states submitted reservations because of concerns that CEDAW would
interfere with state sovereignty. Article 29 of CEDAW refers disputes between states
over the interpretation of CEDAW to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).49 But many
UN member states do not want to fall under the jurisdiction of the ICJ and entered
reservations against Article 29, effectively undermining the only enforcement mechanism
in the original convention. And out of a similar concern for sovereignty, the United States
is the only state that has signed but not ratified CEDAW. President Jimmy Carter signed
it in 1980 but Congress has not ratified it.50

Optional Protocol
In the 1990s, a movement to add complaint and enforcement mechanisms
resurfaced, in part because of the large number of reservations submitted by states that
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had ratified the convention. In 1994, a group of independent experts, CEDAW members,
NGOs, and advocates met at the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights to create a process
for enforcing CEDAW. The CSW established another working group to take on the draft
that emerged from the Maastricht Centre meeting. By 1999, the draft was finalized into
the Optional Protocol, a stand-alone treaty that can only be signed by states that have
ratified CEDAW. The Optional Protocol took effect in December of 2000 and 106 states
have signed on as of 2015 .51
The Optional Protocol allows groups and individuals to approach the Committee
with complaints about states violating CEDAW. This occurs through the communications
procedure. When the Committee decides to investigate the claim this is called the inquiry
procedure. Investigations end with a report by the Committee on the validity of the
complaint and recommendations for how to end the CEDAW violation. To date, the
Committee has gone through 11 communication procedures and one inquiry procedure.52
However there is no formal penalty or consequence of states who are investigated and
they are not bound to comply with the Committee’s recommendations.

Successful Outcomes of CEDAW
In the 35 years since it came into force, there have been several significant steps
forward in ending discrimination against women that can be directly linked to CEDAW
and the Committee. One such area is violence against women. As mentioned previously,
CEDAW does not define violence against women as a form of discrimination. However
several years after CEDAW was ratified the Committee made a general recommendation
51
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in 1989 that set a precedent of commenting on rates of violence against women in all the
member states who sent in reports.53 This opened the door to the submission of
communications procedures involving violence against women.
In 2002, two NGOS, Equality Now and Casa Amiga, submitted a complaint to
CEDAW about the abduction, rape, and murder of women in the city Ciudad Juárez in
the state of Chihuahua, Mexico. Chihuahua shares a border with the U.S. and has a
population of 1.5 million. It has a large manufacturing sector where women often migrate
to the city to work in the maquilas, or factories. 54 The CEDAW Committee’s 2004
inquiry revealed that the maquilas and illicit drug trade placed women, especially
younger women, in dangerous conditions at the hands of factory management and local
drug runners. Law enforcement in the city did little to investigate reports of sexual assault
and disappearance, even going as far as failing to investigate the murders of several
dozen women in the late 1990s. The Committee’s inquiry report on violence against
women in Ciudad Juárez led to the 2007 passage of the Mexican General Law on
Women’s Access to a Life Free from Violence, leading to country-wide reform in the
handling of rape, abductions, and murder cases of Mexican women. 55
CEDAW has also been invoked in the domestic courts of states party to the
convention, such as a 2001 rape case in Tanzania where a woman was raped as a method
of being forced to marry her rapist. The Tanzanian court reinforced Article 16 of
CEDAW, which prohibits forced marriage, and upheld the rape conviction.56
53
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In the 1984 case Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, the High Court of Zambia
upheld that the Intercontinental Hotel was guilty of workplace discrimination because it
refused to let women enter the main lobby without a male escort. The High Court cited
CEDAW Articles 1,2, and 3 as justification for its ruling.57
Women in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were left out of recent land reform
programs and advocacy groups in both countries invoked CEDAW’s Article 16 to get the
government to create legal support systems for women so they would know their rights
and be able to take advantage of buying and owning newly available land. 58
Egypt, which signed CEDAW but with reservations against Article 9, removed its
reservations in 2009 and amended its constitution to allow nationality of women and girls
to be inherent rather than tied to their male relatives or husbands.59

Remaining Challenges for CEDAW
While some CEDAW signatories such as the Netherlands and Nepal have used
CEDAW to create stronger domestic laws against sex trafficking, other states have
continued to ignore the growing problems of prostitution and sex trafficking. In its 2012
Trafficking of Persons Report the U.S. State Department identified that women and girls
are 98% of sex trafficking victims. The report also cited research from UN, which
identified East Asia as the largest source of trafficking victims.60 Almost all the states in
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that region have ratified CEDAW, with several even passing anti-trafficking laws. The
space between the law and enforcement remains too wide and must be bridged.
Accessing reproductive health services, including birth control and abortion, also
remains a challenge for women. In Article 12 of CEDAW women are guaranteed access
to healthcare, including family planning and prenatal care. However several states
entered reservations against Article 12 on the basis that it conflicted with religious values.
Additionally, abortion is not mentioned in CEDAW so efforts by states to reduce abortion
access domestically are not formally breaking any international standard of reproductive
care.

Conclusion
Examining the creation, drafting, ratification, and implementation of CEDAW has
revealed several conclusions about the outcomes of the convention in the last 35 years. It
remains the most comprehensive human rights treaty on the rights of women and has
been ratified by almost all UN member states. The Committee has established a reporting
process that allows for critique of ongoing discrimination. However the extensive number
of reservations and the lack of an enforcement mechanism aim to prevent CEDAW from
creating on the ground change in many states. Rather, CEDAW can be used as a tool by
activists and advocacy networks to hold states accountable to their citizens.

Chapter 4: Methodology and Evaluation of Rights
This chapter will lay out the process for testing H1 and H2 in each of the five case
studies. First we will identify the sources of information for the case studies and then
36

break down the evaluation process for the eight identified political and social rights of
women within CEDAW. By defining standards for evaluation we will be able to show the
change in rights within individual states and compare progress between different case
studies.

Information and Data Sources
Human rights reporting has changed significantly over the past several decades,
especially as the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has increased. As
Keck and Sikkink posit in Activists Beyond Borders, one of the key roles of transnational
advocacy networks is to disseminate information on state behavior.61 To gather
information on the change in women’s rights since the passage of CEDAW we will use
both government and NGO sources, with the goal of gathering unbiased information as
well as understanding states’ ability to accurately represent the status of women within
their borders.
The first information source we shall use when evaluating a case study will be any
reports the nation has submitted to the CEDAW Committee. Under Article 18 of the
convention, within one year of ratifying CEDAW a state must submit a report to the
Committee on “the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have
adopted” to enforce the rights outlined in the convention. States states must then continue
submitting progress reports to the Committee every four years.62 The limitation on this
source of information is that almost all states that have ratified CEDAW have fallen
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behind on the regular reporting process. And Sudan, one of our case studies, is not party
to the treaty and thus does not have any reports to evaluate. However, even with these
limitations the CEDAW reports will provide useful information on how countries
evaluate their progress in implementing the convention.
The second information source this research program will use is the annual U.S.
State Department Human Rights Reports. In 1971 the U.S. Congress created the
Coordinator of Human Rights in the State Department, formalizing the evaluation of
human rights as part of America’s foreign policy. Beginning in 1977, the State
Department began submitting to Congress annual reports on the status of human rights in
countries that received U.S. foreign aid. In 1994 the State Department expanded and
redefined its human rights branch and in 1999 it began releasing annual reports on the
status of human rights across the world.63 The annual Human Rights Report is a valuable
source of information because it is one of the most comprehensive government reporting
processes in the world and it contains both regional and state specific updates.
The third source of information will come from the NGO Freedom House.
Founded in 1941, Freedom House is one of the oldest, most well respected NGOs
working to promote transparency in government and freedom of speech. It began
releasing reports on the status of political rights and civil liberties in the 1970s,
formalizing this process into its annual Freedom in the World report in 1998. The most
recent report, published in 2015, evaluated 195 countries. Nations are assigned a score
from 1 to 7 for their political rights and civil liberties with “1 representing the greatest
degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom.” Based on the average of their
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political and civil scores, countries are then ranked as “Free, Partly Free, or Not Free.”64
The rights examined by Freedom House correspond to the core values outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Freedom House’s annual reports will be supplemented by the NGO’s 2005 and
2010 reports entitled Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa. These two
reports dig deeper into the specific rights outlined in CEDAW. And because of the lack
of timely reporting by state parties to the CEDAW Committee, these two reports by
Freedom House will supplement information on changes in the past 10 years to women’s
rights in Islamic states that is not possible to ascertain from states’ self reporting.

Standards for evaluating rights
Evaluation of each case study will begin with a review of when the country
ratified CEDAW and any stated reservations the nation made against the convention. In
particular, to test H1 we will note if the state had a reservation to Article 2.
Next, we will evaluate the change in the four political rights since the ratification
of CEDAW by the country. Each of the four rights will be evaluated and ranked as being
fully, partially, or not achieved. The following table outlines how we will define each
political right along these three categories:

Table 3
The right to
vote

Fully Achieved
Women can legally
vote and are able to do
so without fear of

Partially Achieved
Legally women are
allowed to vote but
threats to their safety

64

Not Achieved
Women are not
allowed to legally
vote.
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violence.
The right to
hold office.

The right to
citizenship

The right to
own property

Women can legally
hold any public,
elected office and
female candidates
have been able to run
without violence or
intimidation.
Women have full
rights to citizenship
regardless of marital
status and can pass
their citizenship on to
their children
Women can inherent,
purchase, own, and
sell private property.

prevent full
enfranchisement.
Women can legally hold Women cannot
public office but are
legally be elected to
limited to certain roles
public office.
or risk violence if they
actually run for a
position.
Women have some right
to citizenship but can
lose those rights based
on marriage, divorce, or
custody of children
issues.
Women can own
property but are limited
in how they inherit,
purchase, or sell it.

Women do not have
a right to citizenship
as individuals.

Women cannot
independently own
property.

These rankings are based on the evaluation process used by both Freedom House
and by the U.S. State Department in their annual review of political and civil rights. If a
state does not clearly fall into fully, partially, or not achieving a specific political right we
will take time within the case study to explore the status of the right in more detail and
evaluate why it falls outside of these three classifications.
Once we have evaluated the political rights of a country we will move on to
evaluating the four social rights for that case study. Each of the four social rights will be
evaluated and ranked as being fully, partially, or not achieved. The following table
outlines how we will define each social right along these three categories:

Table 4
The right to
education

Fully Achieved
Women can access
free, public education

Partially Achieved
Not Achieved
Women have some
Women are not
access to free education. allowed to attend
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through secondary
school.

The right to
contraception

Women are legally
allowed to use
contraception for
family planning.

The right to
employment

Women are legally
allowed to work
outside of the home
without restrictions.

The right to
marry

Women can legally
marry and divorce at
will, and without fear
of violence.

There may be limits on
what they can learn, or
they may not be
allowed to pursue
higher education.
Women are allowed to
use contraception for
family planning but
with restrictions
depending on their
marital status.
Women can legally
work outside of the
home but with
restrictions on what
type of job or are not
paid equally for their
work.
Women can legally
marry with limits, such
as not being allowed to
divorce or losing
custody of children after
a divorce.

school or are highly
restricted to what
they can learn.
It is illegal for
women to use
contraception.

Women cannot
work legally outside
of the home.

Women cannot
choose to marry or
divorce of their own
will.

Once again, these rankings are also based on the evaluation process used by both
Freedom House and by the U.S. State Department in their assessment of political and
civil rights. If a state does not clearly fall into fully, partially, or not achieving a specific
social right we will take time within the case study to explore the status of the right in
more detail and evaluate why it falls outside of these common classifications. Given the
more common influence of shari’a law in social rights rather than political rights in
Islamic states, this section of case studies may need more in-depth analysis than the
sections on political rights.
Chapter 5: Sudan
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A former British protectorate, Sudan gained its independence in 1956 but has
been trapped in a cycle of civil wars for most of its independence. Much of the fighting
has been between a Christian and Sub-Saharan African south against an Islamic and
Muslim north, but the conflict has evolved to also include issues around pro-democracy
groups, tribal histories, and the influence of oil wealth in the country. The southern part
of the country has acted with significant autonomy since 1972 but the second half of the
20th century saw ongoing attempts by the government in Khartoum to unify the country
by oppressing those living in Sudan’s southern region.65
The most recent military coup took place in 1989 by the National Salvation
Revolution Command Council (RCC). The RCC and its leader, Lieutenant General Omar
Hassan Al-Bashir, suspended the constitution, disbanded all political parties and
suppressed freedom of expression. By 1993, the RCC was dissolved as well and Bashir
was appointed as President. He won a highly corrupt national election in 1996, and put in
place a new constitution in 1998. At the same time, the country’s parliament, the National
Assembly, selected Dr. Hassan al-Turabi as its Speaker. Turabi became the leader of the
National Congress party and began to speak out against President Bashir. Turabi aligned
himself with Islamic fundamentalist groups to consolidate power. In 2000, Bashir
declared a state of emergency, dismissing parliament and jailing Turabi under suspicion
that he was plotting to overthrow the president.66
The early 2000s saw a steady increase in conflict between Bashir’s government
and rebel groups in the South. While al-Turabi remained imprisoned until 2003 and
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President Bashir worked to improve Sudan’s international image, rebel groups in the
South began to form to resist Bashir’s government. As Freedom House explained in a
2006 report “the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), representing black farmers and villagers in Darfur, attacked Sudanese military
garrisons in the region” in the early 2000s.67 In response, President Bashir sent
government backed militias, known as janjaweed, to suppress the Southern uprising.
Villages were burned, crops destroyed, and the United Nations estimates that anywhere
between 70,000 and 400,000 people were killed and 2 million were displaced. The
conflict bled into neighboring states like Chad as refugees fled Sudan, and the United
States labeled the conflict genocide.68
By 2005, the international community had intervened to stop the violence and
find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Both African Union and UN troops were placed in
the region and a peace deal was brokered between the southern groups and President
Bashir’s government. While violence by the government itself slowed after the peace
negotiations, the conflict in southern Sudan continued. In 2011, a referendum was held in
South Sudan, according to the Comprehensive Peace agreement signed in 2005, allowing
South Sudan to separate and become an independent nation. The referendum passed and
in 2011 it became a sovereign nation. At least a dozen groups are attempting to either rule
the new country or are in war with the young government of South Sudan. President
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Bashir remains in power in Sudan and has made limited attempts at political reform,
though his 2015 reelection was widely criticized for its lack of transparency. 69
This case study analyzes the change in women’s rights in Sudan and does not
explore the changes in South Sudan. Because of South Sudan’s rather recent
independence there is not enough data available to assess the change in women’s rights in
South Sudan. However there is enough publicly available date to analyze the changes in
women’s rights in the northern state of Sudan.

Ratification & Reservations
Sudan is not a party to CEDAW, one of only a handful of UN members who have
not signed or ratified the treaty.70 President Bashir refused to sign the convention in 2001,
stating that it "contradicted Sudanese values and traditions."71 This language is similar to
the general reservations against Article 2 that other Islamic states have used.
Analyzing the progress of women’s rights in Sudan will give us a control group
for our research project, allowing us to see how Islamic states have furthered women’s
rights without the aid of international treaties like CEDAW. Sources for this analysis will
remain the same as with previous case studies, with the exception of CEDAW reports
because Sudan has not submitted any since it is not party to the agreement.
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Political Rights
Women are allowed to vote in Sudan, but the frequent suspension of parliament has
led to very few elections. The most recent elections were in 2010 and 2015. International
monitors, criticized both elections and said corruption levels were too high for the vote to
be considered legitimate.72
Progress has been made on a woman’s right to hold public office in Sudan. For many
years the National Assembly had very few female candidates. However, a 2008 reform
created a quota, guaranteeing that women will hold 25% of seats parliament.73 As a
result of this quota, women’s participation in government began to improve. As the U.S.
State Department explains, in 2009 there were “70 women in the 450-seat National
Assembly, three national female state ministers, and one female minister in the GNU.”74
By 2013, women held 87 seats in parliament, 30 women served as state ministers and 6 of
the 56 cabinet positions went to women.75
A woman’s right to citizenship in Sudan is one of the more limited political rights.
Women are considered citizens but it is unclear how much control their male relatives
have over their ability to use their citizenship rights. Women cannot travel abroad without
permission of their husbands or male relatives, though this practice is more strictly
enforced in the north rather than in the south.76 Other issues, such as transferring
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citizenship to children or losing status after a divorce varies within regions inside of
Sudan, often depending on the level of adherence to shari’a law by that region’s local
councils.
The word political right includes a woman’s ability to own property. In Sudan,
women can own property but a widow can only inherit 1/8 of her husband’s property and
a daughter can only inherit 1/3.77 This means that transferring property between family
members heavily favors men. And as we will see below, women’s limited educational
and economic opportunities make purchasing property extremely difficult.

Social Rights
We will begin examining social rights by look at a woman’s right to education.
The state controls public universities, including setting curriculum which can lead to
biased information in subjects from history to the natural sciences. Women are allowed to
attend school but there is no requirement for free or public education on even the primary
school level. Students are frequently harassed, most recently during the 2011 Arab Spring,
when attempts at peacefully protesting for political reform were violently oppressed by
local police forces.78
In particular, female students are harassed for not upholding modest standards of
dress according to certain interpretations of shari’a law. These crimes of “indecency”
have outrageous punishments from up to one year in prison or as many as 40 lashes.79 In
1999, police flogged nine female students for “obscene acts” because they girls were
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wearing pants.80 One of the few positive notes around female education is that over ½ the
professors at Khartoum University were women in 2008.81 This follows a trend seen in
our other case studies of women being able to work in education because it allows for
separation of the genders.
Moving on to the next social right, contraception is legal for married women in
Sudan. However access and use of birth control remains limited. According to the UN
Population Division, only 12% of women and girls between the ages of 15-49 used
contraception in 2012.82 Reasons for this low use include lack of access to healthcare,
especially in rural areas and ongoing civil wars that have led to higher incidents of sexual
violence.
With limited access to education and family planning services, women in Sudan
rarely work outside of the home. Moreover, many women and children have been
abducted and forced into domestic servitude and prostitution through the civil wars. As
the U.S. State department reported in 2003, “In the last approximately 15 years, an
estimated 15,000 Dinka women and children have been abducted.”83 This one statistic
barely represents the thousands of women and girls who have been captured during the
conflict. However verifiable data is very limited because of the ongoing violence in South
Sudan. NGOs and the U.S. State Department also do not have information on how many
women are active in the formal labor market, which indicates extremely limited
participation.
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The most severely limited social right is a woman’s right to marriage. In Sudan,
shari’a law dictates marriage and divorce, meaning women have “very little autonomy or
rights with regard to marital status.”84 For a marriage to be legal a woman must have a
male relative’s permission and there are no formal rights for a woman to apply for
divorce. Domestic violence is not against the law and female genital mutilation is still a
widespread practice. Throughout the 2000s, rape was used by the military and the
janjaweed as a tool of war. In July of 2005, Doctors Without Borders testified that at least
500 rapes took place over a four and half month period in Darfur by police, military, and
militia forces.85 Add to this that in Sudan a woman needs 4 male witnesses to verify a
rape and unmarried, pregnant women are subject to adultery and indecency charges that
carry prison time and physical punishment.86 All of these factors compounded together
leave Sudanese women with almost no control over their marriage, divorce, or sexual
rights.

Conclusion
Sudan is a sharp contrast against the other four case studies when evaluating the
progress in women’s political and social rights. In addition to not being a CEDAW
signatory, Sudan has also undergone dozens of years of civil conflict. Both these factors
have led women to have limited political rights and almost no social rights. The
separation of the Christian population in South Sudan may lead to even more
enforcement of shari’a law in the north. However there are some indications that the
increased political participation of women is making headway. In 2014 the country
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passed a national law against forced prostitution and hosted a regional conference on
anti-trafficking efforts in Africa.87 But based on the existing rights, for our analysis we
will label Sudan as not achieving political or social rights for women.
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Chapter 6: Morocco
As a constitutional monarchy, power in Morocco is divided between a king, a
prime minister, a bi-cameral legislature, and separate judiciary. The monarchy is passed
down through lineage and the King claims his power as the “Commander of the Faithful”
because he is considered a direct descendent of the prophet Muhammad. The king also
retains the title of commander in chief and appoints the prime minister, based on
whichever political party has won the most seats in parliament. The current monarch,
King Mohammad VI, took power after the death of his father King Hassan II in 1999.88
The current prime minister of Morocco is Abdelilah Benkirane. He was appointed
prime minister in 2011 and is a member of the Justice and Development Party (PJD). The
parliament of Morocco is divided into 2 houses, the 325 seat Assembly of
Representatives and the 270 seat Assembly of Councilors. The parliament can approve
bills, question ministers, control the budget and create commissions of inquiry to
investigate government action.

Ratification and Reservations
Morocco ratified CEDAW on June 21, 1993, and has been party to the treaty for
over 20 years. Morocco is one of several Islamic states that had stated reservations when
it ratified the agreement. The largest reservation was against Article 2. Morocco refused
to implement any part of CEDAW that threatened shari’a law and Morocco’s Code of
Personal Status, also known as the moudouwana, which is based on the Malikite school
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of Islamic law.89 Morocco then listed several specific articles in CEDAW that it objected
to. It rejected the right to nationality under Article 9, stating that the nationality of
children should come from their father, not their mother. It rejected the right of women to
live and move freely without the permission of their spouse or male guardians under
Article 15 and a woman’s right to divorce under Article 16. And similar to many
CEDAW signatories both in and outside of the MENA region, Morocco listed a
reservation against Article 29, which is the dispute mechanism that refers problems
between states over CEDAW to the International Court of Justice. 90
Morocco has submitted three periodic reports to the Committee since ratifying
CEDAW. It turned in the first report in 1994, within a year of ratifying the convention. It
submitted the second report in July of 1999, two years past the 1998 deadline. And it
submitted its third and fourth reports in 2006 as a combined document. Morocco has not
submitted any periodic reports since, even though the next reports were due in 2010 and
2014 respectively.
The number of women’s rights groups in Morocco has been increasingly steadily
in the 20th century, with fewer than 5 registered groups in the country prior to 1970 but
23 new groups being founded between 1970 and 1984.91 In 1992, before ratifying
CEDAW, King Hassan II met women’s rights activists in Morocco to hear their requests
for amendments to the moudouwana. He included some of their recommendations in his
1993 reforms of the Code of Personal Status, one of his first steps towards compliance
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with CEDAW.92 In November of 1993, he established the Ministry for Human Rights, the
first institution in the government designed to focus on human rights issues.93 A study
done after the ratification of CEDAW in 1997 found that there were 76 NGOs in
Morocco working to advance women’s issues, such as the “Democratic Association of
Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action, and the Moroccan Association for
Women's Rights.”94 This reflects the continued growth of civil society in the country.
Now that we have some background on Morocco’s process of ratifying CEDAW we can
review the change in Islamic women’s political and social rights in the state.

Political Rights
The first right to examine is the right to vote. Women have had the right to vote in
Morocco since the country’s independence from France in 1956. The right is protected in
Article 8 of Morocco’s constitution. 95 However voter participation in Morocco has
changed significantly over the past several years. In 2007, only 37% of voters
participated in the parliamentary election. The country was split between conservative
Muslim political parties and progressive socialist parties, with conservatives dominating
the voting booth through corrupt election behavior.96 Public protests were initially
suppressed but over the next few years tension grew, ultimately leading to the Arab
Spring movement in 2011. Morocco saw large public demonstrations by students in
Casablanca and Rabat, leading the King to enact constitutional reforms that transferred
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some of his power to parliament, such as the ability to elect a prime minister. These
changes led to some restored faith in the constitutional monarchy system and an
increased voter turnout in 2011 of 45%.97
Women have also had the right hold public office in Morocco since the founding
of the country. Article 12 of the constitution highlights this right, which is the second
political right we want to review. 98 In 1997, only 2 out of 325 seats in the national House
of Representatives went to female candidates. However the number of women running
for office has steadily increased from 8 in 1977, 15 in 1984, 36 in 1993, to 69 in 1997.
On a local level, 1,657 women ran for elections, about 1.6% of the total candidates, and
83 women won seats, about .3% of the total elected in 1997.99 In its CEDAW reports
Morocco attributes this poor participation number to high illiteracy among women,
prevailing stereotypes against women in Moroccan society, and not enough economic
mobility for women. However, for the first time, women have been appointed to and held
positions as secretaries of state on the national level.100
By the 2002 elections, 35 women won positions out of 325 seats in the House of
Representatives, a significant improvement. Women were also appointed to the secretary
general level in two national agencies for the first time in 2002.101 Civil society groups
within Morocco pushed for a 12% quota to be implemented for government elections in
2008, which continued to increase the number of women in public office, especially on
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the local level. In 2003, women held 127 seats, less than 1% of vacant positions in local
government. In 2009, women took over 3,400 local seats.102
The next political right to review is the right to citizenship. The Moroccan
Nationality Code of 1958 “grants women equal rights with men to acquire, change or
retain their nationality” but women cannot pass on their nationality to their husband or
children.103 This is why Morocco has a reservation to Article 9 of CEDAW. In 2006,
King Mohammed VI reformed this issue by announcing that children will be able to have
their mother’s nationality. That same year, Morocco announced it planned to drop all its
reservations to CEDAW.104 This was a historic step and was the result of intense political
pressuring from women’s rights groups in the country.
The final political right to review is women’s ability to own property. In the
1990s during the initial ratification of CEDAW, in Morocco “women inherit only half as
much as male heirs” under the moudouwana and male family members often pressured
women to accept even less than that.105 Initially very little progress was made on this
front, though the state did launch a 1998 program called the National Fund for
Agricultural Loans which funded up to 90% of any new agricultural projects for women,
helping to circumvent problems women face from their inability to inherit property
equally.106 However the removal of Morocco’s stated reservations against CEDAW led
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to constitutional reform on property rights, with women achieving almost full parity
through a series of 2004 constitutional reforms by the King.

Social Rights
Social rights in Morocco have seen less progress since the passage of CEDAW
because they are rooted in the Code of Personal Status. The first right we will review is
the right to education. Article 13 of Morocco’s constitution says public education is free
for all people regardless of sex.107 But as the Moroccan government revealed in its first
periodic report to the CEDAW committee “the illiteracy rate for women is 67%, and
89 % in rural areas, compared with 41 percent for men.”108 In its second report to
CEDAW the Moroccan government set a goal of eradicating illiteracy, starting with
getting up to 80% of girls to enroll in primary school by 2000.109 They attributed the
illiteracy rates to lack of schools in rural communities and expectations for females to
carry out domestic work at home rather than attend schools.
The second right to examine is whether or not women can access contraception.
In this area, Morocco is more progressive then many Islamic states. The use of birth
control for family planning is legal in Morocco for married and unmarried women.
According to the state “the rate of contraceptive use stands at 65.8% in urban areas and at
no higher than 50.7% in rural areas.” Discrepancies in use are attributed to health literacy
and low access to services.110
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Limited access to education has compounded the third right we are examining, which
is women’s right to be employed outside of the home. As of 1999, the country reported
that “women constitute approximately 35% of the work force, with the majority in the
industrial, service, and teaching sectors.”111 And while women were 34% of the primary
and secondary school teaching staff in 1997 and 23% of the staff of higher education, no
women have held the post of “academic director” and very few women have been deans
or rectors of universities.112 This glass ceiling prevents women from gaining positions of
power where they can create reform for themselves. Morocco also struggles with the
exploitation of young girls as prostitutes and domestic servants, known as “adoptive
servitude.” NGOs, in 1999, estimated that tens of thousands of teenage women are
working as prostitutes in Morocco’s cities.113 Since the passage of CEDAW, the number
of women in the workforce appears to be decreasing, with the 2011 U.S. State
Department report showing women only make up about 28% of the formal workforce.
One reason this number may have lowered is that some informal forms of employment
that women traditionally hold are no longer considered part of the formal workforce.
There is also steep inequality within pay, with women earning about 25% of what men do
in the state.114
The final social right we are analyzing is if women are free from coerced marriage.
This was one of the rights the King focused on in 1993 by ending the practice of forced
marriage or “matrimonial constraint,” meaning the woman must agree to it on her own
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for the marriage to be legal.115 Traditional shari’a law allowed a man to divorce his wife
outside of court simply by rejecting her, but the 1993 reforms to the moudouwana require
divorce to take place in court and for the woman to be present, though the woman did not
have to consent to the divorce for it to go through. Conversely, a woman could only
divorce a husband if he agrees, and in most cases this requires payment to the man,
known as “a khol'a divorce.”116 Women’s rights activists in Morocco found these initial
reforms to be very ineffective.
Much work was done to push for greater reform during the Equality without
Reservation regional MENA conference that was held in Rabat from June 8-10 in 2006.
As a result of this organizing by NGOs, the King agreed to increase the minimum age for
marriage from 15 to 18.117 And limits to polygamy added in the 1990s seemed to be
taking effect, as seen in Morocco’s 2006 CEDAW report. As the report states,
“Polygamous marriages decreased in number from 904 in 2004 to 841 in 2005, for a
6.97% decline. This suggests that polygamy may ultimately disappear in practice.”118

Conclusion
Several issues not touched upon by our analysis are still in need of reform in
Morocco, including the state’s laws around sexual assault. For example, marital rape is
not a crime and domestic violence is underreported. A 2010 report revealed that 63% of
Moroccan women said they had been victims of violence in the past year. Sexual assaults
are underreported because of the stigma around losing virginity “victim's families may
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offer rapists the opportunity to marry their victims in order to preserve the honor of the
family.”119
In March of 2012, 16 year old Amina Filali committed suicide after being forced
to marry her rapist, who attacked her in 2011. The case pointed out several flaws in
Morocco’s legal system, including article 475 of the penal code which allows for rape
charges to be dropped if a woman marries her rapist and that even though Amina was
under 18 the marriage was allowed as long as she and her parents agreed to it. In January
of 2014, article 475 of the penal code was amended to correct the loophole, the result of
women’s rights activists and public protests.120
Morocco’s ranking by Freedom House since it ratified CEDAW has been
generally the same – its annual report ranks 1 as the most free and 7 as the least. In 2001,
the first year with available data, Morocco ranked 4 on civil liberties and 5 on political
rights, for an average score of 4.5 and a label of “partly free.” 121 It has stayed at almost
that exact ranking for the last 15 years. Using our defined rankings of free, partially free,
and not free, this case study’s analysis reveals that for Morocco political and social rights
have been only partially achieved.
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Chapter 7: Jordan
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy that was established in 1946 when the country
gained independence from Britain.122 The king appoints the 40 representatives in the
Senate and the public elects the 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies every four years.
The crown has the majority of executive and legislative power, with the ability to appoint
the prime minister and cabinet at will, and although the judiciary is independent it is
highly responsive to political pressure and corruption. Jordan’s jurisprudence is rooted in
the Napoleonic code of the Ottomans, tribal heritage, and shari’a law. While religious
courts deal with social issues like family law and divorce, ultimately their decisions can
be reviewed by the secular Court of Appeals, an interesting hybrid unique to Jordan.123
Women’s civil society groups have existed in Jordan since its independence, with
the Jordanian Women’s Union being founded in 1945.124 Women’s groups pushed for
Jordan to ratify CEDAW and got it published in the national gazette in 2007 so it has the
force of law, meaning violations of CEDAW can be challenged through lawsuits in the
Jordanian courts.125

Ratification and Reservations
Jordan signed CEDAW in 1980 and ratified the agreement in 1992, one of the
first Islamic states to do so.126 As part of the ratification process that same year the state
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created the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) to oversee the rights of
women in the state.127
When it ratified CEDAW, Jordan entered four stated reservations to the
convention. The first is against Article 9, which addresses the right of women to pass
their nationality on to their children. The next reservation was against Article 15 on
women’s right to adequate living conditions. Jordan’s interpretation of shari’a law holds
that “a woman’s residence and domicile are with her husband.”128 The third and forth
reservations are against Article 16, which deals with marriage and family law. The first
reservation is against women’s rights to seek divorce and receive equal division of
financial assets. The fourth and final reservation is against a woman’s right to custody of
her children and freedom to work outside the home.129
Jordan submitted its first periodic report to the CEDAW Committee in 1997, five
years after it had ratified the convention. It submitted its second periodic report in 1999,
perhaps in an attempt to correct this delay. Its third and forth reports were submitted
together in 2006, and it is overdue for its fifth report to the Committee.

Political Rights
The evaluation of women’s political rights in Jordan must be kept in the larger
context of limited political freedom in the state. Jordanians have the right to vote but
cannot change the executive branch. Thus, evaluating a woman’s right to vote really
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reflects the overall limited capacity of any voting rights in the state. Educated women
received the right to vote in 1945, prior to independence, and in 1974 suffrage was given
to all women.130 This push for universal suffrage was the result of organizing by civil
society groups in the country.
Women in Jordan can hold public office, although the opportunities to do so are
limited to election to the lower house of Parliament or appointment by the king to a
ministry. In 1993, the first two women were elected and appointed to the two houses of
Parliament.131 As of 1999, three women had seats in the Senate and none had been
elected to the lower house of Parliament in the most recent elections. The king had
appointed one woman to be a minister in his cabinet.132 Overall, this low participation in
political office reveals that ingrained stereotypes against women continue to hinder their
political participation even though they have the legal right.
Jordanian women’s right to citizenship has evolved slowly since the ratification of
CEDAW. Prior to ratification, women had to have their husband’s permission to obtain a
passport and could not pass their citizenship on to their children.133 The first restriction
was overturned in 2003 and now women can travel without permission. However their
children’s citizenship and movement is still dictated by the father.134 In 2009, Jordan
removed it’s reservation to Article 15 of CEDAW, allowing women to maintain homes
outside of their male guardians’ property.135
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The right to own property has seen less progress for Jordanian women. According
to shari’a law, women can only inherit ½ of what male relatives inherit.136 Jordan’s
Islamic courts also support the practice of welaya, or guardianship, meaning any single
woman under the age of 40 is dependent on her closest male relative, regardless if the
woman is widowed, divorced, or unmarried. If a woman rejects the guidance of her
guardian she loses control of her financial independence.137 Technically women can own
property and have business contracts independent of male relatives outside of the shari’a
courts. But as a 2008 government report demonstrates, welaya is still practiced, with
“only 15.1 percent of women own land and 19.4 percent of women over the age of 15
own apartments.”138

Social Rights
Jordan mirrors Saudi Arabia in some ways when it comes to the social right of
access to education. Education is required and free for Jordanians up to age 16 but limits
on women and their children’s citizenship lead to reduced access to public schools.139
Private education is an option for some but is often expensive. As of 1999, women made
up about 50% of university students.140 This number increased to 55% over the next ten
years, but few women enter the labor market because they are not trained in the skills
needed for existing jobs.

136

Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Jordan.
137
Husseini, Jordan, 9.
138
Ibid., 15.
139
Rana Husseini, Jordan, NGO, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress and
Resistance (New York, NY: Freedom House, 2010), 4,
http://twww.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Jordan.pdf; ibid., 17.
140
Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Jordan.

62

Women’s access to contraception is more open in Jordan than other Islamic states.
In its first report to the CEDAW committee, Jordan reported that 35% of women had
access to contraception.141 By 1999, it is reported that 52.6% of married women have
used contraception, a significant increase. However patriarchal values around child
bearing still exist. As the state wrote in its second periodic report “still a preference for
male children, not only because they are more useful in the fields and orchards but also
because, socially, the larger the family and the more boys as opposed to girls, the prouder
the father.”142 The third and fourth periodic reports revealed contraceptive use to be the
same nationally as in previous years, with higher use among women in urban areas rather
than women in rural communities. The average family size in Jordan had been lowered
from six children to five and there was an increased preference for the intrauterine device
(IUD) over the pill or other methods of birth control.143
With regard to the right to be employed outside of the home, Jordan has struggled
to get women into the labor market. In 1990, women made up 2.6% of the labor market.
Some of the reasons for this low turnout are the legal restrictions on the kind of work
women can take on. Women cannot work from 8pm to 6am and are not allowed in certain
industries, such as mining. Because of these limitations, women mainly work in social
professions such as “education (41%), health and social work (15.1%), and personal,
social, and service activities (5.7%)144 By 1999, women made up 14% of the work force
but often still received much lower wages and work longer hours then their male
141
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counterparts.145 In a step towards reform, in 2009 the JCNW opened the Women’s
Complaint Office, where women can seek counsel on employment discrimination,
citizenship rights, and violence. This development of domestic institutions is the result of
rallying among women’s rights groups in the country.146
A woman’s right to be free of coerced marriage is limited in Jordan. Women’s
testimony in court only counts for ½ that of a man’s in the shari’a courts, and while
abuse is grounds for divorce there is widespread acceptance of violence against women.
This includes the practice of ‘honor killings,’ when a woman is killed in order to protect a
family’s honor if she has engaged in adultery. Article 98 of the Penal Code suggests a
sentence of three months to two years for such crimes, and the country reports at least 20
honor killings each year.147 A particularly violent example of this took place in February
1999 when “Hussein Suleiman ran over his pregnant sister Malak Suleiman three times
with his pickup truck” after accusing her of adultery. She survived the attack but then
after being released from the hospital was taken home and executed by her uncle, father,
and brother. Her brother received 1 month in prison for the crime.148
In 2001, an amendment to the Personal Status Law raised the minimum marriage
age to 18 but allows judges to permit girls as young as 15 to marry with parental
consent.149 Some recent progress against domestic violence was the 2007 opening of the
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first women’s shelter and the passage in 2008 of the Family Protection Law to govern
how health workers and the courts channel domestic violence cases.150

Conclusion
Reviewing the change in women’s rights in Jordan since the ratification of
CEDAW reveals a divide between attempted reforms by civil society groups and
continued patriarchal values carried out in day-to-day life. From an initial ranking of 4.5
and listed as partially free in 1999 by Freedom House, Jordan rose to a ranking of 5.5 in
2010 as King Abdullah dissolved parliament to suppress political uprising that was part
of the Arab Spring movement.151 This upheaval also played a role in limiting women’s
political rights, though moving forward this tide may recede and allow for more political
freedom. Based on our evaluation criteria Jordan will be ranked as partially achieving
political rights and partially achieving social rights.

Chapter 8: Saudi Arabia
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, established in 1932 by King
Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud. It is currently ruled by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and
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has a population of over 28.6 million people.152 Saudi Arabia holds the Quran and Sunna
to be the country’s legal foundation, formalized into the “Basic Law of Governance”
rather than a constitution.153 The Basic Law does not allow for the formation of political
parties or direct elections, meaning the royal family appoints and oversees all government
offices. It also makes the development of a civil society very difficult, with most forms of
activism being seen as political organizing and subject to arrest and punishment.
The judiciary is separate from the monarchy but heavily influence by the opinions of
the royal family and the ulema, the nation’s community of religious scholars.154 The
military and police fall entirely under the jurisdiction of the monarchy. The Mutawaa'in,
or religious police, are a subset of the police force that makes sure individuals adhere “to
Islamic norms by monitoring public behavior” and are known for intimidation, abuse, and
violence against citizens. With no written penal code, arrests and prosecution are left to
the discretion of the police and judges. Adding to this is the state’s restrictive
interpretation of shari’a law that uses punishments that violate international standards of
human rights such as “flogging, amputation, and execution by beheading, stoning, or
firing squad.”155 The country’s economy relies heavily on its oil production, with over
40% of gross domestic product and 75% of government income coming from oil.156
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Ratification & Reservations
Saudi Arabia ratified CEDAW through a royal decree on August 28, 2000.157 It
was one of the last Islamic states to ratify the agreement. It entered three stated
reservations to the convention but they reflect the state’s unwillingness to submit to the
norms outlined in the treaty. The first is a sweeping, general reservation against any
“contradiction between any term of the Convention and norms of Islamic law.”158 This
effectively allows Saudi Arabia to pick and choose the rights within CEDAW it will
uphold. The second reservation is against Article 9, which addresses nationality. At the
time of its ratification of CEDAW Saudi Arabia did not allow women to confer their
nationality to their children, which is why it did not agree with Article 9.159 The third and
final reservation is against Article 29, the dispute mechanism. Like many CEDAW
signatories, Saudi Arabia does not want to submit itself to the authority of the ICJ. 160
Saudi Arabia submitted its first and second periodic reports to the CEDAW
committee in 2007 as one document. It has not submitted a report since, even though the
next periodic report was due in 2011. The combined report addresses some but not all of
the rights outlined in CEDAW and fails to acknowledge many of the harsher truths about
the status of women’s rights in the state.
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Political Rights
The first right to review is a woman’s right to vote. Historically, Saudi Arabia has
held very few elections because the monarchy appoints all government positions.
However in 2005 the state reinstituted municipal council elections, which had not taken
place since the 1960s. Women were prohibited from voting in the 2005 elections. But the
restriction was grounded in not being able to make voting spaces separated by gender and
thus legal under social codes. Women were not prohibited on the grounds that they did
not have the right to vote. This distinction proves interesting when we look at the next
political right, the ability to hold political office.
There are no elected offices in the national government. The King appoints the
Council of Ministers, which oversees all government offices and the 150 members of the
Consultative Council, who advise the King.161 In 2006, women were appointed to be
advisors to the Consultative Council. That year the king also placed women as deputies in
the education and healthcare ministries; the highest positions women have received to
date in the government.162 Then, in January 2013, a royal decree announced that women
would be given 20% of the seats in the Consultative Council, and 30 were appointed the
following month. This came on the heels of a 2011 announcement that women would be
allowed to vote and run for seats in 2015 municipal elections.163
The third political right in our analysis is the right to citizenship. Throughout the
20th century women in Saudi Arabia had citizenship almost entirely through their male
relatives, such as a father or spouse, and could not transfer their nationality to their
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children. A 2007 royal decree said divorced or widowed women who were not originally
Saudi would no longer lose their citizenship and could remain in the country. 164
However women still cannot pass their citizenship on to their children, and in practice
have very little mobility to travel in or outside of the country without the supervision of a
male guardian.
The last political right under review is the right to own property. Women are
allowed to own property in Saudi Arabia and in the past several years the monarchy has
strengthened this right by adding in provisions about owning commercial licenses for
business. One motivation for this is a desire to keep companies within the country owned
by Saudi citizens rather than foreign nationals. In this instance, women’s right to property
is a mix of progress and a continued limitation, with women being able to control
property in name but sometimes being used as proxies by male relatives who want to
expand their business holdings.165
Social Rights
The right to education further reveals contradictions in rights for women in Saudi
Arabia. Public education is free for all Saudi citizens and in 2004 primary school became
required for children age 6-15, with the Ministry of Education’s long-term goal of
making secondary school compulsory as well.166 Women made up 58% of university
students in 2005. 167 And more women than men are in graduate school, with 79% of
PhDs going to women in 2004.168 However, schools are separated by gender and women
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often struggle to travel safely to and from school, frequently being harassed by the police.
An extreme case of this persecution occurred in 2002 when the Mutawaa'in refused to let
schoolgirls flee a burning building because they were not wearing their outer cloaks,
abayas, to cover themselves in public in accordance with shari’a law. As a result 15 girls
died in the fire and the police were not punished.169
Access to contraception is also an extremely limited right for women in Saudi
Arabia. Sex outside of marriage is illegal, so birth control is only available to women
who are married. In its only report to the CEDAW Committee the Saudi government
stated that all forms of contraception are available and a study from 1991-2002 revealed
that 32% of married women in Saudi Arabia used a form of contraception. And a 1996
study said that 81% of married women knew how to use contraception and over 43% had
used a method in the past.170 These figures are difficult to trust given the high stigma
around contraception use even in married women, and little to no data exists on the use of
contraceptives among unmarried women in the U.S. State Department or Freedom
House’s human rights reports on Saudi Arabia.
The right of women to be employed outside of the home exists in theory but
several other limitations on women make participation in the labor market extremely
difficult. In Saudi Arabia women are not allowed to gather in public and cannot travel
domestically or abroad without permission from their male relatives, making working
outside the home difficult.171 For those women who do work, most are employed in the
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public sector, 84% working in education.172 It is also illegal for women to socialize with
men in public. When women violate this separation they can be accused of “khulwa,” the
illegal mixing of unrelated men and women, and be punished by the police.173 This forces
workplaces to be segregated, or more often, simply bars women from working at
restaurants, factories, stores, and other common private institutions. Women are also not
allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia, which is another inhibiting factor for working outside
the home. Most women who work do so in same-sex schools or in healthcare, jobs that
take place in institutions segregated by gender.174 In 2002, some reforms were made and
women were allowed to apply for civil-status ID cards without the permission of their
closest male relative, mahram, which would allow them to travel within the country.
However women’s participation in the workforce remains some of the lowest in the
world at about 14% according to statistics from 2009.175
A woman’s right to marry in Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most restrictive of the
social rights that this research program examines. There is no minimum age for marriage,
and a woman’s consent is not required for a marriage to be legal. Thus child-brides and
girls being sold into marriage to pay family debts is a common practice.176 If a woman
wants to marry a non-Saudi she must have the permission of the government. Men can
take up to four wives, making polygamy legal. 177 Men can divorce at will in Saudi
Arabia, but women can only divorce their husbands if he “has deserted her, is impotent,
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or has a loathsome disease” and must have another male represent her in the courts.178A
2004 National Dialogue Conference on Women, hosted by Prince Abdullah, suggested
women be allowed to study law so they could represent other women in family court on
issues like divorce and custody. A few universities then began to allow women to study
law and in 2007, the Ministry of Justice announced it would allow these women to act as
legal consultants though not as lawyers.179 The King, rather than civil society groups,
initiated this step towards reform, since Saudi Arabia limits political freedom to such an
extreme degree.

Conclusion
There are several other social rights that we did not examine in our analysis that also
impact women’s freedom in Saudi Arabia. Similar to Morocco, domestic violence and
sexual assault are underreported. There is no legal protection against domestic violence
and for a woman to prove a rape she must prove it with her attackers confession or the
testimony of four male witnesses.180
Saudi Arabia has consistently received a ranking of 7, the worst possible score, from
Freedom House’s annual human rights report from 1999 to the present. However King
Abdullah, who ruled from 2005 to 2015, seemed to have some interest in expanding
human rights, especially the rights of women. Prior to taking the throne, he supported
progressive reforms like allowing employed women over the age of 40 to drive, although
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the measure failed.181 In 2004, he supported the creation of the National Society for
Human Rights, an NGO focused on reviewing human rights violations. Ten of its 41
initial members were women.182 However, the fact that all reform must come from the
monarchy limits the hope of progress in Saudi Arabia. Thus for our evaluation, political
rights and social rights are ranked as not being achieved.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
By reviewing the change in women’s political and social rights in Sudan,
Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia we have been able to test the two hypothesizes of this
research study. The first addressed the role of reservations in CEDAW:
H1: Arab States that have ratified CEDAW and do not have a stated reservation
to Article 2 have seen improvement in women’s rights since ratification. And
those countries who are not CEDAW participants or have reservations that
essentially nullify the treaty, conversely have not seen improvements in women’s
rights.
We labeled our control, Sudan, not a participant in CEDAW, as not achieving
political and social rights for women. This supports H1 because Sudan is a nonparticipant. Saudi Arabia has a reservation against Article 2, which essentially nullifies a
state’s participation in the treaty. Saudi Arabia also has a general reservation against any
piece of CEDAW that violates the sovereignty of its monarchy or violates shari’a law
also supports H1. As Neumayer explained in his scholarship on RUDs, general
reservations like the one Saudi Arabia submitted also nullify a state’s participation in a
treaty.183 And our case study of Saudi Arabia labeled it as a state that has not achieved
political and social rights for women.
Morocco initially had a stated reservation to Article 2 but eventually repealed all
of its reservations to the convention. An interesting point of this process is that the
removal of reservations in 2006 was a result of women’s civil society groups earning
more of a voice in the state. Our analysis ranked Morocco as partially achieving political
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and social rights for women. Jordan did not have a stated reservation to Article 2 and also
ranked as partially achieving political and social rights for women. The progress in
Morocco and Jordan supports H1.
The second hypothesis of this research program argued that CEDAW would
create more change in political rights than social rights:
H2: More progress has been made in political rights rather than social rights in
states that have ratified CEDAW.
In our control case study of Sudan we saw some progress on women’s political
participation in the state and no movement on social rights. Since Sudan did not sign
CEDAW this progress does not reveal much about H2 though it does challenge the idea
that CEDAW ratification is necessary for political change. But since H2 does not make
that strong of a claim it still holds up.
Our other three case studies all support H2 in that they saw more progress in
political rights than social rights. Jordan and Saudi Arabia saw limited movement in
social rights because of adherence to shari’a law’s treatment of marriage and divorce.
But political rights did progress in both countries within the confines of their political
systems. For example, women began to be involved in the Council of Ministers and
Consultative Council, which are appointed positions, but have yet to be allowed to vote in
a national election.
The theory behind H2 is that civil society in a state can utilize CEDAW
ratification to push for change in democratic institutions within the state. This is based in
Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang’ theory of change.184 Because religious courts and
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councils often control social rights in Islamic states, our case studies revealed that
activists had more success challenging political rights through state institutions and
national leaders. For example, in Morocco activists were able to influence the writing of
the periodic CEDAW reports, a formal vehicle for influencing political rights. However
changes to the Personal Code, which governs social rights in Morocco, were more
difficult to achieve and had to come directly from the king.

Further Questions
This research program was limited in the scope and depth of its analysis by
several factors, including the decision to do a qualitative review and the selection of only
four case studies. Because CEDAW clearly delineates over a dozen rights of women,
further research projects could employ a quantitative analysis of progress on those rights.
Gaps in information, especially the lack of periodic reports to the CEDAW committee by
member states may make this kind of analysis difficult. However, as Cole demonstrated
in his 2013 analysis, quantitative research on CEDAW’s impact can be achieved.185
The role of human rights treaties in implementing international norms remains an
area rich with research opportunities. The newly enacted Optional Protocol within
CEDAW would be an interesting apparatus for studying enforcement and compliance
with international human rights norms. More research could also be done on violations of
CEDAW reported by individuals, especially civil society groups in member states. These
are questions for future researchers to employ and hopefully will lead to a continued
dialogue on how to improve women’s access to political and social rights.
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